Frederick the Great’s reign was a continual succession of battles in which the monarch’s military genius was repeatedly demonstrated. But beyond the person of him existed one of the best armies in the world, whose soldiers were famous for their level of discipline and blind obedience. This article aims to review the politics, structure and organization of the war machine that allowed the emergence of Prussia as a power since the mid-eighteenth century, as well as its myths, its innovations and its limitations.
Reforms in recruitment and the cantonal system
The greatest triumph to be achieved by any country during the eighteenth century was the construction of a powerful fiscal-military state that would allow him to sustain a large army with which to win wars and achieve supremacy. This is why in «absolutist» Europe, military spending represented the largest budget item, normally between 20 and 30% of the total. But in the case of Prussia, this went even further, since there they regularly represented up to three quarters of public spending, even in times of peace (Showalter, 2016: 14).
Between 1740 and 1756, 83% of the income was dedicated exclusively to the maintenance of the militia. Furthermore, while a power like Austria retained separate civil and military administration until the reforms of 1750, Frederick centralized his in the General Directorate for War and Finance (Generaloberfinanz, Kriegs, und Domänendirektorium). All this makes it possible to speak of Prussia as a decidedly militaristic State, giving credibility to that phrase attributed to both the minister Friedrich von Schrötter and the Count of Mirabeau who said that: «Most states had an army, but the Prussian army had a state.”.
Only a ruthless tax system and a competent bureaucracy made the rational exploitation of state revenues possible, but at least Prussian subjects could share this heavy burden with those in the occupied territories. The march of the Prussian troops on Saxony, Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania was accompanied by the appropriate “contributions”, a real robbery that, together with the generous British subsidies, provided a notable relief to the finances of the Crown. Otherwise, the demographics were not very promising. At the beginning of the reign of Frederick II the number of inhabitants of the Prussian provinces did not exceed 4,500,000 souls. Deducting approximately half from this amount for their status as women, together with minors and the elderly, there were barely a million men who considered themselves capable of bearing arms (Luvaas, 1999: 75).
However, the State managed to squeeze the most out of the scarce existing population. This is evident when comparing the Prussian case with other neighboring states such as Saxony. The Electorate was similar in size and population to the kingdom of Prussia before the annexation of Silesia, but its small army numbered barely 9,000 at the time of its total surrender at Pirna, save for a few cavalry regiments then present. in Poland. For his part, that same year Frederick’s army consisted of no less than 89,000 foot soldiers and 32,000 cavalry plus 20,000 garrisoned troops. This tolerance of the subjects, who stoically fulfilled their duty to take turns taking turns, has sparked debate. And it has sometimes been attributed to a pietistic religious revival that emphasized personal commitment to one’s vocation (Dwyer, 2001: 229).
But those levels of adherence were not due solely to Calvinist resignation or the use of coercion. The soldier’s training was designed to instill in him a genuine spirit molding him into loyalty to the state and the king. In addition, this willingness of families and communities to hand over part of their children annually was the merit of a conscription system that had managed to extract, on a small scale, but systematically, the country’s human resources. The cantonal system did not encounter much resistance due in part to the integration of local magistrates and elites in the recruitment processes, which made it preferable to the arbitrariness of previous methods. Although it could also have benefited from that old medieval idea that all fit men are responsible for the defense of the kingdom (Möbius, 2019, 41).
As demanding as its impact on Prussian subjects was, the so-called cantonal system fulfilled its task with very efficient results by the standards of the time. This method of recruitment had been implemented during the previous reign and without a doubt, the legacy of the Soldier King is essential when it comes to understanding the successes of his son. Thus, in 1713 Federico Guillermo I had approximately 40,000 men, while at his death they were already around 80,000. At that time, not only had the number of troops been doubled, but from the very year of his accession to the throne, dependence on foreign subsidies, especially the Dutch, had ceased (Dwyer, 2001: 60).
The social extraction of the Prussian soldier
As always, the weight of military service fell on the shoulders of the most disadvantaged. But an agrarian-based subsistence economy like that of Prussia, or any other kingdom at the time, could hardly bear the loss of its workforce during the most productive years of its life. Nor were members of the landowning class interested in a considerable decrease in their labor force in the middle of the century of physiocracy.
While the idea of an army composed almost exclusively of poor peasants, small landowners, and urban workers is correct, it can also be misleading, for in eighteenth-century Prussia everyone owed service to the state. Those not fit to wear the uniform simply did so in many other ways, such as paying taxes, giving up houses for quartering, producing food for soldiers, raising draft animals for military purposes, selling fodder at fixed prices or compulsory labor benefits in the new network of fortresses built throughout the country… All these activities contributed to the process of integration between the army and the subjects.
Furthermore, since a random selection process seemed too irrational for an enlightened king like Frederick William, a large number of socioeconomic groups were exempt from the obligation of military service: aristocrats, businessmen, landowners, apprentices from a wide spectrum. of trades, textile workers, theology students, first-generation agrarian settlers… the list grew every year and each category had its logical basis (Showalter, 2012: 21). Only children were never recruited and, in principle, certain religious groups, such as Mennonites, Quakers or Jews, were never called into the ranks. However, the rural elites, of which the sons of the Dorfschulzen (village administrators), who were crucial as mediators between troops and officers (Möbius, 2019, 41).
The cantonal system introduced in 1732-1733 divided the kingdom into districts based on the number of ‘households’. Each regiment was assigned a specific district, which was subdivided into as many cantons as there were companies in the regiment. All able-bodied men between the ages of 13 and 40 were considered eligible for enlistment, though up to 20 they were trained for only two months each summer. Since their physical requirements were significantly different, infantry, cavalry, and artillery shared the same districts with no problem.
The best men would join a regular unit for service and receive instruction with the corresponding regiment, while the rest would go on to serve in a garrison in that same area and act as a reserve for the field regiment (Marston, 2001: 20 ). In this way, the men received training without this having material repercussions on the economy of the State. The reviews took place once a year, during the spring-summer months, four days of concentrated activity that represented the culmination of those two months of training. In terms of utility, the magazines were very limited, but they had great ritual importance. In contrast, the fall maneuvers represented a much more realistic performance than the spring parades.
Another key to this system is that the conscripts returned to civilian life and their professions, being exempt from service for ten months, so they only had to spend the remaining two in the barracks. In general, attempts were made to prevent reviews and maneuvers from coinciding with the harvest season, which is when they were allowed to stay at home to pursue their occupations. In peacetime, cantonal conscripts (kantonisten) lived in their homes with their families, foreigners (ausländer) were housed in private homes, and only professional soldiers stayed with their families, including if they had them in the barracks, where a particular Garrison Society.
Among the women who could accompany them were their wives, daughters and sisters, but there were also special permits for soldiers who lacked the money or permission to marry their girlfriends and who recognized them as legitimate company, they were called Liebsten or “dear”. In the absence of their husbands, these women had various duties, which ranged from supplying them on guard duty to supervising the cleaning of the stables, and in many cases they performed additional jobs related or not to the military (Möbius, 2019, 44). Likewise, there were a large number of camp workers, street vendors, prostitutes, etc.
The army reached the number of 194,000 soldiers in 1786. Up to a third of the population of Berlin from 1750 was made up of soldiers and soldiers’ families. There was also no set limit to the length of military service, but each man continued to serve under his regimental colors until he was wounded or exceeded the required age. The truth is that there were not many pensions or aid for veterans or widows of soldiers, whom we found on numerous occasions claiming money from local administrations. Many retired soldiers worked as guards, janitors, peddlers, street vendors, orderlies… (Johnson, 1975: 265).
A second important source of soldiers for the Prussian army were foreigners, most of whom naturalized by marrying native women. It is estimated that, by 1756, up to 25% of the army was made up of mercenaries. As the war progressed, deserters and prisoners from other armies were also pressured to enlist and increase their numbers (Marston, 2001: 20).
Since the…