The Blue Division was the most well known Spanish volunteer unit who enlisted to fight in the Second World War. Much has been written and discussed about these men who went to fight on the Russian front. However, the formation of the Division did not have the full support of the population and many sectors of the Franco government. Next, we will talk about the context in which it emerged and its initial composition.
The Blue Division
In June 1941, the wounds left by the Civil War in a large part of the population were still latent. Many of the survivors did not hesitate to point towards the USSR as the main culprit of the country’s ills after the war. They alleged that Soviet communism was one of the main factors that motivated the war, which is why a remarkable feeling of revenge arose in part of the population.
That’s why when Serrano Suner called up potential volunteers for the Blue Division on June 24 of that year, many came with various reasons in mind. The first was to combat the “guilty communism” of the Civil War, others who had had a relationship with the Republic did so as a way of whitewashing their image (such as the Spanish director Luis García Berlanga) and those related to the regime who had been in the republican zone during the war, as a way to promote themselves socially and to be able to acquire better conditions regarding salary and rationing.
It was also a way to gain access to administrative positions that had become vacant and that were reserved for ex-combatants or people who collaborated with the rebels in the war. In addition, many saw the opportunity here to be able to defect to the USSR, since the 45,500 men who left for Russia They were not only recruited in barracks, but also in prisons.
The Spanish situation in 1941
two of the fundamental pillars on which the Franco’s regime were the Army and the Spanish and Traditionalist Falange de las JONS. Both, until May 1941, shared Germanophile sympathies. The Army praised the conservatism and militaristic tradition of the Third Reich, while the Falange felt close to German National Socialism. However, it is well known that Serrano Súñer did not arouse special sympathy among the Francoist military leadership. In addition, the Army, as the winner of the Civil War, knew that it was the main support of the Franco Regime, so it was not willing to lose power to the detriment of the Falange. This can be verified with the different government restructurings between 1939 and 1940, in which the majority of relevant positions went to the hands of the military.
It was no secret that most army generals, like Yagüe, Munoz Grandes either Stephen Infantes, were Germanophiles and saw in the invincibility of the German troops a form of continuation of the regime if they joined their cause in the war. However, other officials like Kindergarten, Jordan Gomez either Varela they had a strong sympathy for the Anglophile current. For the latter there were only two possible options regarding the war: prepare the defense of Spain against a possible German invasion and not provoke the Führer with his opposition to entering the war.
According to the German representation in Spain, The Teutonic country had the largest representation in a foreign country here, sending some 7,000 telegrams during 1942. It had 500 collaborators working in Spain, 180 representatives in the different consulates and 134 secret counterintelligence agents. In addition, from 1936 to 1945, 4 ambassadors succeeded one another here. A fundamental role here was played by the ambassador between 1937 and 1943, Eberhard von Stohrer, who, unlike Ribbentrop, was in favor of Spain’s neutrality, which would end up costing him his dismissal.
However, it should be noted that the German diplomatic system in Spain, in mid-1941, was in a highly privileged position. In addition, he was favored by Germanophile sectors, from Falangists to high officials in the Franco government, who did not hide his sympathy for Germany. So that, Serrano Súñer was the one who worked the most in favor of the German causewhich made many enemies because it was the main political link between Spain and Germany.
This large diplomatic volume distributed throughout Spanish territory was in charge of carrying out acts for everyone in the country in which the German participation in the Civil War was recalled. In addition, the German authorities showed special interest in appearing in the Spanish colonies, in publicizing themselves in the press, which they achieved with the approval of Serrano Súñer, and in carrying out cultural interference in Spain, opening educational centers in which young people received classes in German language.
Relations between Germany and Spain before the Blue Division
For Germany, the fight against England posed two operations of the utmost importance. In the first place, the direct invasion of the British Isles with a massive landing of troops, which would be carried out through Operation Sea Lion, which would fail. The second consisted of taking Gibraltar to close off the Mediterranean. This would imply a direct interaction with Spain since the taking of the rock was proposed through a land invasion of German troops from Spanish territory in Operation Félix.
The failures of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain in September 1940 brought the Blitzkrieg to a halt. From that moment, the German high command ordered its submarine fleet to sink any ship that tried to supply the British Isles. They also saw the need to close the Mediterranean to the English through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar. The blockade of the latter necessitated the entry of a “non-belligerent” Spain into the conflict hand in hand with Germany.
For this, the aforementioned “Plan Felix”scheduled for January 10, 1941. Previously, during 1940, five important Spanish-German diplomatic meetings took place: The failed meeting in Hendaye between Hitler and Franco on October 23, the three meetings between Serrano Súñer and the Fürher between the 17 on September 25, the five that Súñer had with Ribbentrop between September 16 and November 19, Serrano Súñer’s interview with Stohrer again on September 25 in Berlin, and the meeting between Franco and Canaris on December 7.
In said interview, Canaris informed Franco of the date of the invasion of Gibraltar, which the caudillo dismissed for economic and territorial reasons, since entering the war would mean the immediate loss of the Canary Islands and the African colonial possessions (based on the Carrero Blanco’s report known as The twenty-one reasons for Spain not to enter the Gumisses). Franco’s refusal led to the suspension of the Felix Plan on December 10.
The failure of the negotiations between Spain and Germany is due to the extremely poor state of the Spanish economy after the war, Franco’s excessive territorial demand in Africa and the knowledge of the German authorities that Vichy offered more military guarantees in Morocco in the face of a possible British attack.
Following hints of a possible German invasion of Spanish territory, Franco met with Mussolini and Petain, who supported his version of the impossibility of Spain entering the war. In addition, Franco responded to Hitler by stating that he would not take possession of Gibraltar until he had the Suez Canal in order to close off the Mediterranean. In the same way, he reproached the German for not making a firm offer regarding the supplies and material that Germany would allocate to Spain. Therefore, Spain would not enter the war.
On the other hand, it should be noted that since 1939, personalities such as Francisco Gomez Jordana either Juan Luis Beigdeber, who had both been foreign ministers, were making economic agreements with England and Portugal in order to supply grain and fuel to Spain. Thus, Spain could in no way form units of troops that would have to fight with the English and their European allies.
The crisis of May 1941
During May 1941in the midst of growing tension between Germany and Spain, a series of events took place between the Army and FET de las JONS that would lead to the greatest moment of instability for the Franco government. This resulted in a more direct state control of the Single Party and with the decisive loss of power of Serrano Súñer. However, the real beneficiary of this situation at a time of conflict between the two powers regarding the world conflict was Francisco Franco. In addition, during these incidents, Miguel Primo de Rivera was arrested, Pilar addressed her resignation to the authorities, and Colonel Valentín Galarza Morante was put in charge of the Ministry of the Interiora position that Serrano longed for to join this position with those of Foreign Affairs, Party and Press.
As he entered the government, Galarza began to reduce the power and importance of the Falangists, substituting the Falangist guard for policemen. Likewise, he took a series of anti-Serranist measures, such as the revocation of the decree that exempted the Falangist press from prior censorship. Also, Franco gave political positions in the Ministry of the Interior to men he trusted and he was in charge of carrying out a severe military restructuring that would ensure his power in the midst of this political crisis.
The Falange’s discontent with appointments such as Galarza or Iturmendi was made clear by the resignation of positions among which were 10 provincial heads. Tension increased when the police discovered that radical Falangists were collecting weapons.
The struggle between Galarza and Serrano continued with Franco as mediator who continually used evasive maneuvers to justify the control of the press by the Government. Serrano Súñer continued to lose support when he proclaimed himself as José Antonio’s successor. However, the old shirts did not propose to support Serrano against Franco despite the arrests that took place, such as that of Miguel Primo de Rivera.
The events culminated on May 13 when Serrano hinted at his resignation to Franco, who asked him to reconsider for the good of Spain. After a meeting with the caudillo the next day, Serrano proposed to calm the Falangists’ spirits the creation of a Vice-Secretariat of Popular Education, dependent on the party and to which the Government had to transmit control of the press and propaganda. In addition, Franco undertook to hand over the Treasury, Agriculture and Labor portfolios to members of the phalanx. However, Franco would soon regret these decisions and officially dismissed the undersecretary and the national delegate for Press and Propaganda and the already resigned Tovar and Ridruejo.
On May 19, Franco temporarily leveled power between the Army and the Falange, giving Arrested, Jose Antonio Giron Y Miguel Primo de Rivera Secretary’s purses…