Since 1936, the Spanish were locked in a civil war that was on its way to two years. At the end of July 1938, the Popular Republican Army launched an offensive on the Ebro that would become the biggest confrontation of the Spanish conflict.
Battle Background (I): The Nationals
The year 1938 began with a few dark months for Republican arms. At the beginning of January, Teruel, the only provincial capital that fell into Republican hands, had been taken. This success was partial, since later, at the end of February, the square was once again occupied by the national army. From here the disaster unfolds.
The battle of Teruel was a great wear for the republican army. Franco’s troops, on the other hand, only needed two weeks to rest and start moving again. On March 7 the offensive against Aragon was launched. Franco’s army was less than 100 kilometers from the Mediterranean, and arriving would mean opening a new supply line from abroad. “It was the first time that large numbers of combat tanks were used by both sides, as the nationals now possessed close to 200 of these vehicles, largely small German and Italian tanks, and larger Soviet tanks captured at the time. enemy” (Payne, 1986: 196).
The national offensive was unstoppable. In the early days of it, the government lines collapsed without anything being done. Franco’s divisions entered Aragon; in the former areas where anarchist collectivizations had existed since 1936. Likewise, some units entered northwestern Catalonia and also slowly through the Pyrenees. General Yagüe, anxious to enter Catalonia, was ordered to stop completely during the second week of April.
The Republic army seemed to have finally collapsed, as little or no resistance had been offered during the enemy offensive. “During the first main phase of the offensive, in March, total national casualties among units in combat had been just 1%; so weak had been the republican resistance” (Payne, 1986: 198). On April 3 of that year, the Minister of the Interior, Ramón Serrano Suñer, “El Cuñadísimo”, had declared “the war is coming to an end”. On April 15, Good Friday, the 4th. Colonel Alonso Vega’s Division of Navarra finally reached the Mediterranean.
It was then that Franco, in one of his many questionable decisions, made the determination to do not continue with the attack towards Catalonia and focus on Valencia. This fact once again changed the course of the war, because in Valencia, the Republicans were well entrenched in their defensive lines and that is where the rebellious offensive crashed. This certainly helped give the Republic military some breathing room to reorganize and continue the fight.
Battle Background (II): The Republicans
Despite the fact that the situation stabilized at the end of April of that year, the Republicans had received severe blows in the development of the Francoist offensive. The main fact was that the republican zone had been divided into two parts, the center on one side and Catalonia on the other. The central zone, which included Madrid, was where most of the republican corps and units were located, as well as being an important financial sector. The area of Catalonia was at a disadvantage, although it was also a key industrial center.
Another blow occurred at the beginning of April, when the defense minister, Indalecio Prieto, seeing the situation, chose to resign from his post. Prieto was beginning to be a nuisance to the resistance policy that had been imposed on the Republic. Also, “Azaña, who never conceived victory as possible and always opted for the imposition of a cessation of hostilities supervised from abroad, cried out for “peace, mercy and forgiveness”” (Jiménez, 2013: 6). Faced with the defeatism and pessimism of some Republican politicians, was the group led by Juan Negrín and Vicente Rojo who defended a policy of resistance.
Negrin exclaimed “To resist is to win”. The president of the council himself assumed the defense portfolio and together with General Vicente Rojo they faithfully believed in victory. A victory that should of course be supported by the army and also by the international situation. During the month of March, the German annexation of Austria had taken place, something that put the appeasement policy on the ropes. León Blum, president of the Republic of France, was a supporter of the Second Republic, and during that month reopened the borders so that war material could enter Catalonia.
In the government there was a clear thought that the international situation was changing, that the existing peace was going to crumble and a new world conflict was going to start. Of course, the republican government would be an ally of the Western powers. For this they had to demonstrate strength against enemies. Vicente Rojo, as on other occasions, attempted to organize a decisive operation that would return the initiative to the Republic and turn the tables on the war.
The preparation of the operation
At the end of spring and beginning of summer, a new mobilization began in Catalonia. This resulted in the call-up of replacements in 1927, 1928 and 1941, followed by those in 1925 and 1926, and finally those in 1919 and 1922. This produced the arrival of thousands of recruits who ranged in age from under 20 and above 30 to 40. In total, 200,000 new recruits were framed in the so-called Army of the Ebro (under the command of Modesto) and of the East. Although the truth is that only half of the troops, between 80,000 and 100,000 men participated in the fighting.
Vicente Rojo planned the crossing in different sectors of the Ebro as a surprise operation. “General Rojo’s plan consisted of crossing the Ebro by surprise and launching an attack – the main one – through the center of the arc that describes the river between Fayón and Xerta (Gandesa)while demonstrative assaults were carried out to the north, between Mequinenza and Fayón, to prevent a flank counterattack and cut off enemy communications” (Beevor, 2013: 527). The objective with this offensive was to release the pressure that Franco’s armies were exerting on Valencia. As in Teruel, the mission was also to distract national troops from other fronts. In addition, a second offensive would be launched from the Center front, in the direction of Extremadura, if the Ebro offensive was successful in the first weeks.
For the crossing of the Ebro, the V Army Corps (divisions 11, 45 and 46) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Lister, the XV Army Corps (divisions 3, 35 and 42), commanded by the also communist, Manuel Tagüeña. ; and finally the XII Army Corps (divisions 16, 44 and 56), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Etelvino Vega, who would act as a reserve. The participation of units from the International Brigades should also be highlighted. The internationals during these dates are already few and their formations are full of Spaniards. There are different opinions about these units sent to battle, Beevor cites an English volunteer who expresses that in many cases they are poorly trained recruits, while Jorge M. Reverte says that these units are chosen by Vicente Rojo due to their effectiveness and loyalty.
The preparation is thorough during the summer, republican explorers cross the river at night to reconnoiter the banks and report on their status. Peasants and people from the other side are also contacted to ask about the best places. “The passage of the Ebro was meticulously rehearsed, for a whole week, by the Republican troops in ravines, in rivers and in the sea. The engineering corps staged the crossing in the waters of the Delta with the bridges manufactured in Barcelona or bought from France” (Beevor, 2013: 528).
Another issue that helped this offensive to be planned and executed was the arrival of war material in Catalonia from March to June 13, when France closed the border again due to the crisis in Czechoslovakia. 25,000 tons of supplies are recorded, including rifles, machine guns, ammunition, planes and tanks. In spite of everything, there was always a lack of weapons to equip the entire troop. “For example, the 35th. Pedro Mateo Division (11,817 men at a rate of between 3,000-3,300 for each of its three mixed brigades) will register only 5,578 rifles, lacking individual weapons assigned to some 1,500 combatants per brigade” (Oña, 2013: 13).
The Franco zone before the battle
The opposite bank of the Ebro is under the orders of Yagüe. The national troops defend an oversized front, a front that runs from the junction of the Segre and Noguera Ribagorzana rivers to the mouth of the Ebro in the Mediterranean. The defense is divided into three sectors, and each one is occupied by a division. In Segre (1) there is the 40th Division and a Tercio flag, in Gandesa (2) the 50th Division, and finally in Bajo Ebro (3) the 105th Division plus two battalions of the Cavalry division and a section of tanks armored. The 13th Division is stationed in the reserve, one of the best in the National Army according to doctor and author Juan José Oña.
Thus, the Francoist device on the Ebro would be garrisoned by: Army Corps of Navarre under the command of General Solchaga, with the 3rd, 61st, 62nd and 63rd divisions; from Aragón under the command of General Moscardó, with the 51st, 53rd and 54th divisions; and finally the Moroccan under the command of the already named Yagüe. The Moroccan body will be in charge of receiving the republican bid.
With troop movements halted by order of the generalissimo, Yagüe’s mission was to maintain a defensive attitude and resist a possible government attack. This waiting for the development of events led him to carry out observation and aerial reconnaissance missions. These small missions were of great importance, since they had first-hand information on the movement of troops behind enemy lines. Similarly, the testimonies of deserters and people who lived in the region also confirmed this fact, that the Republicans were preparing some kind of operation.
So much so, that General Yagüe began fortification work throughout the month of July. A surveillance line was established on the same bank of the river to repel possible incursions, in addition it was ordered to set up ambushes in places of obligatory passage. The defensive area was highly fluid and it was hoped that the Ebro moat would act as a natural defense for the battalions stationed there. The Yagüe General Staff analyzed the situation and affirmed that an operation that tried to cross the river would be difficult to carry out “because it required expertise, technique, audacity, discipline, decision and a perfect functioning of the services: “None or…