Usually it has been considered battle of cannae as one of the great victories in history. Hannibal he has been remembered by great strategists, generals and historians as one of the greatest tactical geniuses due to this victory. In it, the consular armies of Lucius Emilio Paulo Y Gaius Terentius Varro they were annihilated. For this reason, in this article we will tell you in detail what the keys to this victory were and how both the Roman and Punic armies were formed. However, although it is paradoxical, the end of Hannibal was marked by a battle with a really similar development. That is why on this occasion we show you.
The Battle of Cannae (216 BC)
In the year 218 BC, Hannibalat the head of his army had crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. The Punic strategist had invaded Italy and defeated the Roman legions; first in the Trebia (218 BC) and in the Trasimene (217 BC). After these disasters Rome appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator. who for a year refused to meet Hannibal in open combat, attacking the Carthaginians in their supply lines and even achieving a small victory.
But Fabio’s cautious strategy was not shared by the army itself, which accused him of cowardice, and by the Senate, which even suspected that he wanted to prolong the war to maintain command and whose members were also exasperated by the havoc that the Carthaginian army was causing in Campania, a region full of villas and rural properties of the senators.
Year 216 BC in the plains bathed by the Aufido. The armies of Carthage under the command of Hannibal Barca and the legions of Rome, under the command of the consul Gaius Terencio Varrón, prepare to face each other. They would do it in a battle of proportions never before seen on Italian soil, the battle of cannae. Rome bet big: she had gathered sixteen legions. Between Romans and allies, they gathered a total of approximately eighty-seven thousand men. Facing them, the Punics with forty-five thousand men. As both consular armies are united into one, Roman law ordered daily alternation in command between the two consuls; Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro. Varrón ruled the day that Rome decided to present Hannibal.
The Romans, explained Sosilos, played a particularly interesting game: the constant changes of the supreme command. The patrician Emilio Paulo was hesitant and in favor of waiting, like the former dictator Fabio; the plebeian Terence Varro wanted to attack. – Today it is Terencio’s turn to command. Excuse me, look. – Sosilo pointed to the armies, (Haefs, 2005: 456).
Hannibal deployed on his left wing, facing the Roman cavalry, six thousand horsemen under the command of Hasdrubal. Of them, two thousand Hispanics and four thousand Celts. In the center, commanded by Hannibal himself, were sixteen thousand Celts with eight thousand Hispanics on their flanks. Ten thousand Libyan-Phoenician soldiers were positioned at either end of the infantry formation. The Celts and Hispanics were positioned in an arc towards the enemy. In the vanguard, in front of the center, he placed six thousand skirmishers. On his right wing he placed three thousand five hundred Numidian horsemen under the command of Maharbal (Arre Caballo, 2017a).
It is probably one of the most famous fights in history. In fact, it has transcended to other scenarios such as literature. For this reason, in this article we are going to talk about it taking as a reference the description of it by Gisbert Haefs in his novel Hannibal (1989). in parallel the literary narration and the historical facts:
– Here, to the left – Sosilos pointed to the riders of that wing –, are the Iberian cataphracts, around two thousand, and about five thousand Celts, most of them Insubri. They are under the command of Asdrúbal el Cano, who has Monomaco and Bonqart as seconds. On the opposite wing are the remaining Numidians, about three thousand. Hanno, with Maharbal and Cartalón. They will lash out at allies; Hasdrubal will do it against the Roman cavalry
Later Antigonus heard from the chronicler the numbers and disposition of the troops. Along the left wing was a bloc of about five thousand Libyan hoplites, under the command of Muttines; next to these, three thousand Iberians on foot. Then in the center under the direct command of Hannibal, ten thousand Insubros and Boios; another three thousand Iberians, the remaining five thousand Libyans. And then the Numidians (Haefs, 2005: 457, 458).
The Romans had chosen a flat terrain where Hannibal could not hide his forces, as he had done at Trasimeno (217 BC). They pretended that he too could not effectively use cavalry, his most feared weapon. In this way it had happened in Trebia (218 BC). Terencio Varrón placed the right wing of him, leaning on the river Aufido. The Roman cavalry made up of 2,000 horsemen was under the command of Emilio Paulo. In the center commanded by Gnaeus Servilio, he positioned the eight legions, with thirty-two thousand men, and the allied infantry, forty thousand, in two lines.
According to Polybieither “the maniples were closer to each other, the intervals were shorter”. In the vanguard were the velites, harassers, numbering seven thousand. On his left flank, the four thousand eight hundred Italian horsemen, commanded by Varro himself.
Through the thin curtain of dust could be seen the solid, staggered ranks of Roman and Latin foot soldiers. That is, they could not be distinguished, only an immense and incredibly solid phalanx could be seen (Haefs, 2005: 456).
The Roman formation was arranged with a greatly enlarged background, so that the soldiers ended up forming a huge rectangle, with a relatively small front. Varro’s strategy seemed simple: try to put pressure on the Carthaginian center, seeking to imitate what happened in the Battle of Trebia, where the legions had managed to break the Carthaginian line.
The first move of the battle was a cavalry charge from Hasdrubalagainst his Roman counterpart, at the same time that Maharbal and the Numidian cavalry were attacking Varro’s cavalry on the other flank.
The Greek did not need to follow the chronicler’s finger. Iberian cataphracts and Hasdrubal’s Celtic horsemen suddenly charged. Then something strange happened (Haefs, 2005: 457).
In the thick of the battle, the Punic Skirmishers and the Velites engaged in a hail of missiles, the Velites being repelled. After this, the Carthaginians arranged a line with about eight hundred balearic slingers to try to stop the advance of the Roman troops, but was unsuccessful.
The Roman phalanx continued to advance; the skirmishers of the Punic army were repulsed (Haefs, 2005: 457).
The melee battle came. The shock of the Carthaginian center against the Roman mass that was coming on top of it. It was crucial to Hannibal that his center give way without disintegrating. In ancient battles, most casualties occurred when a battle line was broken. Morale and discipline were essential to keep the line under pressure while falling back.
But the Greek only saw a completely absurd move, a charge from the center against the Roman phalanx. Only the center; the Iberians and Libyans on the left and right did not advance. The Punic battle ranks, until then in a straight line, showed a curvature directed towards the Romans.
Slowly, very slowly, the monstrous mass of Roman legionnaires pushed the Punic center back until it was in line with both wings again, and then further back; now it was in the Punic rear that a curve had formed, and it seemed about to break. Celtic horsemen, dismounted, closed the gaps (Haefs, 2005: 458).
When Hasdrubal’s cavalry had completely routed the Roman cavalry, putting it to flight, part of the horsemen broke up and circled around. He broke through the Roman rear, to the right flank, where he attacked the allied Roman cavalry from the rear. These, attacked from both fronts, quickly dispersed. Leaving both Roman flanks unprotected.
Hasdrubal’s cataphracts had not long pursued fleeing Roman horsemen; , the cataphracts had ridden to the rear of Terence Varro’s Latin cavalry, to, together with the Numidians and lightly armed soldiers, eliminate the Roman left wing in a matter of minutes (Haefs, 2005: 460).
With the Punic center in continual retreat, the Romans believed that their plan was bearing fruit. Therefore, they rushed their attack, increasing the pressure. Because of this, they reduced the space available between man and man. This maneuver finally caused them to get in each other’s way.
. The Roman phalanx was beginning to suffocate in its own mass. Eighty thousand soldiers, formed in long columns, and almost none could intervene in the fight. The largest army ever to set foot on Italian soil had driven the semicircle of perhaps ten thousand Celts back, to their lines, and then further back (Haefs, 2005: 460).
Hannibal activated his trap; at his signal, the Hispanic and Libyan-Phoenician infantry, formed on the flanks, advanced against the now unprotected flanks of the Roman formation. The victorious Punic cavalry attacked from the Roman rear, closing the trap.
– Poor blind fool! – He pointed to the curvature of the Punic formation, which had meanwhile become almost a semicircle. The Celtic ranks were still holding their ground, there was no gap.
– Because crazy?
– Can’t you see? Sosilos, can’t you see? The greatest victory of the greatest strategist there has ever been
New trumpet signals. Now at last, after two hours of waiting, the Iberians and Libyans attacked, turning towards the center. The Roman advance had allowed the Iberians and Libyans to find themselves at the height of the enemy flanks; now they closed the vise. ; the light soldiers joined the Iberians and Libyans advancing toward the center from the right, holding out their pincer arms. Hasdrubal’s cataphracts retreated, turned around and joined the two ends of the Punic pincer, closing the fence (Haefs, 2005: 459, 460).
What happened next was complete carnage, although the exact number of casualties will probably never be known. Titus Livy Y polybius they offer us some figures according to which they died between 50,000 and 70,000 Romans and between 3,000 to 4,500 were taken prisoner. Only 14,000 men managed to escape, most of whom had managed to open an escape route to the nearby city of Canusius.
That didn’t last long; Hasdrubal’s cataphracts charged the fortress and the Romans who had managed to escape the siege surrendered without resistance. Other groups of soldiers continued to chase fugitives. other troops surrounded the two camps, in which some survivors had barricaded themselves (Haefs, 2005: 461).
The next day both Roman camps surrendered; their access to the Aufido had been blocked…