On September 1, 1858, Spanish troops landed in Cochinchina, in the south of what is now Vietnam. They were part of an intervention force made up of contingents sent by Spain and France. Their objective, in theory, was to stop the massacre of Catholic missionaries and converts that was taking place in the Annam Empire by order of Emperor Tu-Duc.
Much has been said about the Spanish participation in the conflict in Cochinchina. Above all, regarding the fact that France made use of the Spanish troops as cannon fodder, mere support to achieve her interests and lay the foundations for what, over time, would end up becoming French Indochina. But what is the truth in all this? Was Spain really scammed? Didn’t he get anything out of the conflict against the Kingdom of Annam? This article will seek to answer will seek to answer all these questions about the aforementioned expedition.
Background: Spaniards in Asia and the Conchinchina
The Spaniards had been present in Southeast Asia since an expedition led by Miguel López de Legazpi and the Augustinian friar Andrés de Urdaneta arrived on the island of Cebu in 1565. The conquest of the archipelago that would later be known as the Philippine Islands, in honor of King Philip II, was relatively quick. Soon the Spanish turned their attention to China, Indochina, and the Spice Islands. However, Asia was not America and expansion in the east was hampered by events in other parts of the world and the need to allocate limited resources to other theaters of operations.
Although that did not prevent certain advances, such as the entry, in 1614, of Jesuit missionaries, fleeing from persecution in Japan, in the kingdom of Tonkin. In the S. XVIII these missions had expanded considerably gathering more than 5,000 missionaries and 300,000 native converts to the Catholic faithwhich resulted in increased distrust on the part of local authorities towards these foreigners (Peña Blanco, 2017: 14).
During the 19th century, Catholic missionaries were involved in the confrontations and political events that shook the region, since they acted as mediators or even as representatives of the opposing factions. In 1857, a Christian Annamese named Pedro Phung, from the Lé dynasty, aspired to the throne with the support of many Christians (Peña Blanco, 2017: 15), which led the Annamese government to take severe reprisals.
That same year, the Annamite Emperor Tu-Duc, who had already published in 1848 an edict that decreed the extermination of Christianity in his domains and a ban on trading with Europeans, began a persecution that resulted in the martyrdom of José María Díaz Sanjurjo. He was Bishop of Plataea and Apostolic Vicar of Central Tonkin and many other Spanish, French and Annamite missionaries. This had the consequence that the France of Napoleon III, self-proclaimed protector of the Catholic missions in Asia (Del Rey y Canales, 2012: 195), protested. Faced with the indifference of the Annamese imperial authorities, he decided on military intervention.
The Franco-Spanish intervention in Cochinchina
France had strong reasons to intervene against the Kingdom of Annam. Her interests in the region came from the previous century when, in the time of Louis XVI, a treaty opened the port of Turón to French trade. It was something that the governments of Paris had not forgotten. Emperor Tu-Duc and the late Bishop Sanjurjo had given France the possibility of establishing a position in the Far East, thanks to obtaining naval bases in the Mekong delta and other points in the territory of Cochinchina. An opportunity that they were not going to let pass by (Peña Blanco, 2017: 17).
Spain was involved when Napoleon III, through his foreign affairs minister, Count Walewski, requested the country’s involvement in the expedition with a contribution of between one and two thousand men. Aware of the seriousness of the matter, the diplomatic failure and the resurgence of persecution, he decided on military intervention. This came motivated by a sense of dignity and Catholic sentiment. On December 12, Madrid accepted the French proposal (Peña Blanco, 2017: 18).
Thus, one of the great mistakes was made by the Spanish side when facing this expedition. The government of Madrid, blinded by the opportunity that the Emperor of the French had offered it, did not demand the signing of any agreement between the parties to stipulate the details of the military operations and, above all, the conditions that would be required of Tu -Duc at the peace signing. An error that did not go unnoticed by the press and other political groups, which gave rise to criticism against the government (Peña Blanco, 2017: 18).
It was agreed that the size of the contingents that would form the expeditionary force would be 1,500 men, with the Spanish troops being conditioned by the internal situation of the Philippine colony (Inarejos Muñoz, 2007: 46), and that the meeting point would be the Hainan Island, China. For his part, Napoleon imposed his conditions on two other points: the Spanish troops would be placed under the command of Rigault de Genouilly. This, in addition, would speak on behalf of France and Spain (Peña Blanco, 2017: 19). This should have alerted the Spanish authorities to France’s intentions.
The Captain General of the Philippines, Fernando de Norzagaray, assembled a force from the garrison that Spain had posted in the archipelago, in his majority indigenous troop led by Spanish officers.
On the French side, the first setback occurred when Rear Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, who was leading the French troops in the Second Opium War against China, informed the Emperor that he did not have sufficient resources to allocate to the new theater of operations. After signing the Tien-Tsin peace treaty with China on June 28, 1858, Rigault was able to launch operations against Tu-Duc (Peña Blanco, 2017: 20).
On June 30, 1858, a new government headed by Leopoldo O’Donnell, of the Liberal Union, came to power in Spain. One of his first measures was an attempt to concretize the aspects of the campaign and the collaboration with France. But it was not easy to establish the objectives of the expedition, since France had given too vague promises and the reports sent by the Spanish consul in China and by the Captain General of the Philippines agreed that since Spain possessed the Philippines, it should refrain from any territorial claim in Indochina (Peña Blanco, 2017: 21).
On August 12, hostilities against the Kingdom of Annam began. Without being the objective of the article, it can be summed up in an operation where the Spanish troops, despite the protests of their commanding officer, Colonel Carlos Palanca Gutiérrez, were used as mere auxiliary troops. However, the core of the French troops soon began to break down. The cause was diseases and the climate of the land. Spaniards and Tagalogs were much better acclimatized to it. The objective chosen by the French command was the capture of Saigonan important port in the Kingdom of Annam, in order to pressure Tu-Duc to sign peace.
One important thing to note about this campaign is that both European nations soon lost interest in it. In 1859, public opinion, French and Spanish, their attention was focused on the Italian war against the Austrian Empire and the African War against Morocco, respectively. Fortunately, the French troops fighting in China were able to be sent as reinforcements to the Expeditionary Corps after the end of the Second Opium War. On the Spanish side no reinforcement was sent. Not even supply. Over time, a dwindling number of Spanish troops found themselves armed and dressed in a mixture of French and Annamite equipment.
With peace… come benefits
Finally, on June 5, 1862, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Trade and Compensation between Spain, France and Annam. He arrived after more than four years of fighting. Hué granted absolute freedom of action to the Catholic missionaries. He also opened several ports to Franco-Spanish trade and promised to pay compensation of four million dollars. Furthermore, he ceded three provinces to France. The foundations of the French colonial empire in Indochina had just been laid. This is when the different analyzes come to the question. Durán is highly critical of the Spanish achievements in this peace since the Spanish demand for an Annamite port was not met. The height of humiliation was reached when Madrid had to haggle with Paris to collect its part of the compensation (Durán, 1979: 231).
For his part, Martínez Gallego shows a more optimistic point of view. It may be that Spain did not get its port. But she gained access to a very valuable resource in the age of Imperialism: the coolies. They were indigenous workers in a semi-slavery regime widely employed by the European colonial empires. And it is that the coolies, whether they came from China or Cochinchina, had been one of the options that the large landowners of the island of Cuba to supply the lack of labor on the island as a complement to the slave labor. To this end, between 1847 and 1874, about 125,000 coolies were introduced into Spanish Cuba (Martínez Gallego, 2001: 146).
But Cuba and its sugar mills were not the only place where Spain planned to settle coolies. The projects of Captain General Norzagaray, organizer of the Spanish body of the expedition to Cochinchina, for the internal colonization of the Philippine archipelago had the objective of combating piracy, securing the commercial centers of the colony and reinforcing Spanish sovereignty against the ambitions of other powers. However, there were points in the vast archipelago where the Spanish presence was, at best, token (Inarejos Muñoz, 2007: 47). It is no coincidence that, among the main places of provision, in addition to Shanghai and Canton, there were the centers of the Cochinchina war scene: Amoy, Pivatao, Wampoa and Saigón (Martínez Gallego, 2001: 146).
It was a huge undertaking, involving large Filipino traffickers. For example, the company of shipowners Matías Menchacatorre, who joined Cubans and Spaniards who operated in the Antilles. The city of Manila itself became a supply point for coolies. As a whole, it has been estimated that the Antillean traffickers who participated in what is known as treats yellow of Asian workers, they got with it some benefits of 700 million reais (Martínez Gallego, 2001: 148). Such profitability in that business was well worth a war. And so it was done.
At the commercial level, it is worth highlighting expectations generated by the opening of new markets. They were intended to promote trade between the Asian continent, the Philippines and the…