At the Battle of Marathon, an inferior force of Greek hoplites seized an opportunity to defeat their Persian enemies, exploiting their superior armor and discipline to win one of the most famous tactical victories in the ancient world.. However, this did not end the Persian threat against the independent Greek city states.
Data from the Battle of Marathon
- Who is it: Almost 11,000 Athenian and Platian hoplites, led on the day of the battle of Marathon by the Athenian general Miltiades, faced a multi-ethnic Persian army numbering some 25,000 soldiers, under the command of the Persian Artaphemes and the Median nobleman Dalis.
- As: The Athenians weakened the center of their line and strengthened their wings, allowing the Persians to advance through the center, only to be defeated on the flanks and see their center encircled by the victorious wings of the Greek army.
- Where: The plain of Marathon, about 42 km from Athens.
- When: 12 August 490 BC
- Because: The Persians wanted to attack Athens to punish the city for its support of the rebellion of the Ionian Greek populations.
- Result: The Persians were expelled from Greece for 10 years.
Background
Around 539 BC, the Persians, under Cyrus the Great, had conquered much of Anatolia, including the coastal Greek towns in Ionia. Initially, relations between the Persians and their Greek subjects were relatively cordial. During the following decades a series of tensions arose that soured that relationship. The Persians impeded Greek economic development with trade restrictions. In addition, the Persian autocrats imposed puppet tyrants on the Ionian city-states, something that went against the ethics of the independent-minded Greeks. In 499 BC the Ionians finally broke out in open revolt against the Persians. Their leader, Aristagoras of Miletus, sought help among the mainland states of Greece.
His first attempt at an alliance was with Sparta. The Spartans had the best army in Greece, and were therefore a good choice. Unfortunately. King Cleomenes did not understand that sending forces to fight for the distant Ionian Greeks was of any interest to the Spartans, so he declined to support the revolt. Aristagoras got a better reception in Athens. He delivered a speech before the Athenian assembly, in which he argued that the Persians were inferior to the Greeks in combat, and that the wealth of the great empire would bring much booty to the victors. The assembly debated the matter and decided to send aid to their Ionian cousins; a squadron of 20 warships. The Greek navy stopped at Ephesus, where the troops landed. The army headed for the Persian capital, Sardis; the city was quickly taken and, before the approach of a Persian army, burned and razed. In a subsequent battle, the Greeks were defeated and the Athenians decided to return home. The revolt continued until 495 BC. but the result was inevitable: the powerful and centralized Persian armed forces had the upper hand over the individualistic Greek states in fighting a protracted war.
Although the revolt had been successfully put down, the Persian king, Darius I, learned of the Athenians’ involvement and was furious. A story by Herodotus tells that Darius ordered a slave to tell him Master, remember the Athenians three times before each dinner, so as not to forget to punish them for their interference. And so, in 492 BC, Darius sent an expedition under his son-in-law Mardonius to do so, but hostile Thracian tribes and bad weather off Mount Athos forced the forces to return home.
The bell
greek hoplite
Darius was not going to give up on his plans to punish the Athenians. Thus, the following year another expedition was prepared. This was going to cross the Aegean to punish the Athenians and the Eretrians, who had also supported the revolt, burning their cities and enslaving the populations. This force would be transported by sea, thus avoiding the problems that had beset Mardonius’s expedition. The naval component of the expedition consisted of almost 600 ships. Perhaps 200 of them were warships that served as escorts for the fleet, while the other 400 were transports that would carry the soldiers and their supplies. Among the transports were a number of units specially designed for the horses, which would carry the mounts of the Persian cavalry. The landing force numbered perhaps 25,000 armed men, including a small contingent of cavalry, perhaps 1,000 in all. This force was under the command of Darius’s nephew Artaphernes and Datis, a nobleman of Median descent. Also present was Hippias, who had ruled Athens as a tyrant until he was ousted in 510 BC. The Persians understood the rebellious nature of politics in a Greek city-state, and no doubt saw the potential of using Hippias to raise a fifth column within. of Athens itself.
The Persian fleet put to sea from Tarsus and sailed west. The navy touched several islands along the way and reduced them by threats or by force. An important landing was made on the island of Euboea, to attack the city of Eretria, indicated by Darius, along with Athens, to be punished for their participation in support of the Ionian revolt. The people of Eretria were in a quandary about what to do in the face of such a powerful force.
Some were inclined to try to defend the city, while others supported its abandonment and the continuation of the fighting from the nearby mountains. However, before a decision could have been made, the city was surrendered by a faction that had been bribed with Persian gold in exchange for opening the city gates. The city’s temples were burned down in retribution for the destruction of Sardis. From Euboea, the Persians went to Attica, where they landed on August 5 on the Marathon plain, almost 42 km from Athens. The site was no doubt chosen in consultation with Hippias, as it offered everything the Persians needed, a long beach where ships could be beached, an ample supply of water, access to Athens, and room to manoeuvre, especially for cavalry. if the Athenians decided to fight there.
When the Athenians learned of the landing of the Persians, they sent for help: the herald Pheidippides made a famous 225 km race to Sparta. Unfortunately, the Spartans could not send help because of a religious holiday, the Carneia, which would not allow them to march until August 12. With this news, the Athenians debated the measures to be taken. Some were in favor of preparing for a siege; though, given Hippias’s presence and Eretria’s treachery, this seemed rather risky. Others argued that it was imperative to keep the Persians locked up in Marathon and not allow them to approach the city. In this group was General Milcíades. His opinion carried some weight, since he had had previous relations with the Persians and had fought in the Ionian revolt. As a consequence, the Athenian army of almost 10,000 hoplites, a heavily armed infantry, marched on Marathon. They were joined by a force of between 600 and 1,000 hoplites from the city of Plataea, a former ally of Athens.
Provisions
The Persians dragged their ships ashore along a narrow beach called Schoinia, behind which was a swampy expanse. Beyond the swamp was a town with a large stretch of open ground near a spring; the Persians established their main camp there, because it would provide them with water and fodder. The Athenians and their Platan allies encamped at the southern end of the Marathon plain, north of a small swamp, the Brexissa, between some high ground and the sea. The Greeks protected their camp with fallen trees, provided with especially sharp branches.
The Battle of Marathon
spartan hoplite
The two armies met face to face for perhaps four days. Both sides had good reason to wait. For the Athenians, each passing day brought Spartan help closer: with the end of the Carneia on August 12, the Spartans could march to their aid and arrive perhaps on the 15th. Furthermore, given the vast expanse of the Marathon plain , and the ability of the Persians to deploy and maneuver their cavalry there, it made no tactical sense for the Greeks to abandon the favorable ground near their fortified camp, which was situated between the sea and the hills. This would make the heavily armed hoplites with their phalanx formation a formidable force against the lightly equipped Persians. For their part, the Persians also had reason to believe that time was on their side, at least initially. As in Eretria, they expected help from within the city itself. In this case, they hoped that Hippias’s supporters would betray the city in their favor, no doubt with the encouragement of Persian gold. The Persians were waiting for a signal, a highly polished bronze shield that would flash from Mount Pentele, indicating that all was ready.
Although the details of the plan are not known, it seems clear that the Persians would embark the bulk of their troops on ships and sail to Athens while the Athenian forces were still at Marathon. Furthermore, the Persians did not wish to assault the Athenians and Platanese while they were in their strong positions at the southern end of the plain, because the terrain would negate both their numerical advantage and the mobility of their cavalry.
However, on the afternoon of August 11, the Persians were running out of time. They had received no sign of the shield-bearing fifth column of Athens, and the Spartan festival would soon be over. This meant that the Athenians could expect Spartan reinforcements, and the presence of such tough and well-disciplined hoplites would dramatically transform the military balance on the Marathon plain. As a consequence, the Persians began to embark part of their forces on transports so that they could set sail for Athens the next morning, while the rest of their forces kept watch on the Athenian and Platanese hoplites at Marathon. Even without the signal of the shield, the Persians could expect help from within the city if the army was absent.
This force would be under the command of Datis and seems to have included most of the cavalry, which would be very useful in rushing towards Athens once the detachment landed in Faliro Bay. Artaphemes would remain at Marathon and maintain a tight blockade of the Athenian camp. He probably had about 15,000 men with him, almost exclusively infantry. Fortunately for the Athenians, they were alerted to the Persian plan by some sympathetic Ionians serving the Persians. They sent the famous message the…