We tell you what axiology is, its history and its relationship with ethics. In addition, we discuss the philosophical approaches of monistic and pluralistic axiology.
Immanuel Kant made great contributions to the theory of value, which is part of axiology.
What is axiology?
Axiology is a branch of philosophy that reflects on values, their origin, development, nature and functions. It is also known as the theory of values and value judgments.
As philosophical reflection, axiology is part of (and is often confused with) ethics, metaethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of religion.
One of the tasks of axiology is to be able to say what a value is. So, distinguishes between intrinsic values and extrinsic values:
- Something is said to have intrinsic value when it is good in or of itself.
- Something is said to have extrinsic value when it is good for something external to itself.
Axiology has to determine which entities have intrinsic value. If we conclude that there is only one type of intrinsic value, we are dealing with a monistic theory, as is the case with hedonism: for hedonism, only pleasure is good in itself.
On the other hand, if we conclude that there are several values, as the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) believed, we are dealing with a substantive theory. This is how the Kantian theory of moral values works, which seeks to define which abstract entities can function as regulative ideas of the moral sphere.
Frequent questions
What is axiology?
Axiology is the theory of value.
What values does axiology distinguish?
Axiology distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic values.
What are values?
Values are regulatory maxims that govern moral behavior.
See also: Ethics
History of axiology
Axiology developed in the 20th century thanks to the work of Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), a German idealist philosopher and founder of the neo-Kantian Baden School.
Windelband believed that philosophy had the task of seeking the principles that guarantee the solidity of knowledge. These were, for him, values, since philosophy did not aim at factual judgments but rather value judgments, such as “this thing is true” or “this thing is beautiful.”
Thus, philosophy had to seek values of normative validity, unlike natural laws that were based on empirical facts. Windelband distinguished between an ontological reality, typical of the world of science, and a deontological reality, typical of what ought to be, inherent to values and axiology.
In the first half of the 20th century, on the other hand, the distinction between values and facts was worked on. Max Scheler (1874-1928) continued Windelband’s work and differentiated good from value. Thus, he pointed out that goods are things that have value, while values are qualities thanks to which things become what they are.
Although Scheler developed axiology in theoretical terms, there were other thinkers, such as José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), a Spanish philosopher, who thought differently. For Ortega y Gasset, values were not perceptual, but rather the objects that the values could embody were perceived. For example, beauty, as a value, embodied in a painting, as an object. Thus, the values were estimable, not perceptible.
Neopositivism also developed some aspects of axiology, including logic. He maintained that value judgments did not have a factual content, that is, based on the facts, typical of factual judgments. Marxist theorists, for their part, claimed ontology for values by saying that value is the expression of the social content of the object.
It may be useful to you: Beauty (in philosophy)
The values
There are different ways of characterising values. David Hume (1711-1776), for example, believed that they were nothing more than words that in themselves did not represent anything. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), on the other hand, did not attribute substance to them in themselves, but thought that values could affect not only people, but also scientific truths and everyday observations.
Immanuel Kant thought of values as regulative maxims and desirable practices. That is, he believed that values should regulate behavior and, in addition, be ideal examples of ethical behavior. This corresponds to the etymological meaning of the term “value,” which in Greek is axios and means “worthy of appreciation” or “estimable” and also “proportionate, convenient.”
For Kant, ethical values were regulative ideals, given in their proper measure. They functioned as a model of behavior and could vary depending on who wanted them. In this sense, it can be thought that notions such as “kindness”, “sincerity” or “humility” and “responsibility” are subjective constructions that are a product of history and the accumulation of a set of desirable ethical practices, transmitted over time.
In this way, the following set of characteristics can be observed in the values:
- Specific historical character of values. The content and position in the hierarchical scale of values varies depending on the context.
- Hierarchical nature of values. Values are subordinated and subordinate to each other.
- Parasitic existence character. Every value needs a bearer or good to exist.
Furthermore, there are different positions regarding the theory of values: the objectivist, the subjectivist and the objective-subjectivist, depending on where the values acquire their existence.
- Objectivist conception of values. These owe their existence to characteristics of the valued object or of the subject – object – social context relationship in which the values are given, independently of the will and conscience of the valuing subject.
- Objective-subjectivist conception of values. These owe their existence both to the will and consciousness of the valuing subject and to the characteristics of the valued object and the relationship subject – object – social context in which the values occur.
- Subjectivist conception of values. These owe their existence to the will and consciousness of the valuing subject, regardless of the characteristics of the valued object and the relationship subject – object – social context in which the values occur.
Monistic and pluralistic axiology
Monist and pluralist axiological theories are different philosophical approaches to understanding the nature of values and their relationship to each other. Both theories attempt to address the question of whether there is a single source or fundamental principle for values or whether there are multiple foundations and types of values.
Monistic axiological theory
A monistic axiological theory holds that all values are derived from a single source or fundamental principle. This means that all values, whether moral, aesthetic, spiritual, or of any other kind, are reduced to or based on a single supreme value or basic principle.
For example, in some monistic ethical theories, the fundamental principle may be the highest good or absolute moral duty. Thus, all moral actions or values are evaluated based on their relationship with that single principle. Similarly, in a monistic aesthetic theory, there could be a supreme criterion of beauty or harmony that defines all aesthetic judgments.
Pluralistic axiological theory
A pluralistic axiological theory asserts that there are multiple sources or fundamental principles for values. In other words, there are various types of values that cannot be reduced to a single category or hierarchy. Each type of value has its own nature and origin, and is not subordinated to a single principle.
In a pluralistic perspective, there are moral, aesthetic, pragmatic, spiritual values, among others, and each of them is valuable in itself without needing to be reduced to a higher or fundamental value. Thus, the diversity and complexity of human values is recognized and respected, avoiding reducing them to a single principle or unified system.
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References
- Fabelo Corzo, JR Practice, knowledge and assessment, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 1989.
- Fernández Bulté, J. Philosophy of Law, “Félix Varela” Publishing House, Havana, 1997.
- López Bombino, LR (Coordinator and Academic Compiler), The ethical knowledge of yesterday and today, volume II, Editorial “Félix Varela, Havana, 2004
- Kant, I. (1977). Critique of Pure Reason. Porrúa.
- Kant, I. (2020). Critique of practical reason (Vol. 1). Verbum Publishing.
- Bilbeny, N. (1992). How to think about moral values based on Kant? Taula: quaderns de pensament, 21-26.